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ABSTRACT 
 Cash management practices for corporate treasurers are in a state of instability in 
recent years. Events during the credit crisis of 2008 have had an impact on how 
organization’s cash positions are managed. This has led corporate treasurers to juggle 
unprecedented amounts of cash across multiple bank counterparties and invest these funds 
based on previous investment policies with potentially inflexible limits. Many regulations 
have been passed to strengthen domestic and global financial systems, yet the risk of 
default is not completely removed and there are many uncertain ties that corporates face.  
 To succeed in the uncertain financial environment, counterparty risk tools must be 
put in place to improve the visibility of potential operational risk, along with a higher 
frequency of reviewing and updating investment policies. It is crucial for corporates to look 
beyond the traditional market perceptions and bank credit ratings to evaluate counterparty 
risk. Although these continue to be a valuable metric, they should be incorporated with 
other forward looking market risk metrics such as credit default swaps, capital and asset 
resiliency metrics, and growth and profitability metrics to their current investment 
guidelines review. By integrating risk metrics to help formulate an investment policy, 
corporates can adapt to the changing financial environment.  
 This thesis examined methodologies to develop a more accurate and immediate 
viewpoint of counterparty creditworthiness. This was done through the creation of models 
using market information to set values to view the strength of counterparties and the 
likelihood of default. Models were created for both financial institutions and countries 
where cash or investments are placed. Depending on the models, this restricts the 
 
 
permissible investment options that an institution or country has. This approach allows the 
company to invest more with higher rated counterparties, and sets a maximum to those who 
are deemed high risk of default.  
 The findings of this thesis identified that it is crucial to classify the right metrics and 
look beyond traditional market perceptions and bank credit ratings. By implementing a 
balanced process that regularly monitors current market indicators of counterparty risk, an 
organization will be in a stronger position to define and determine the potential risk. This 
creates a balanced view of both backward looking and forward looking metrics such as 
long term debt ratings and credit default swaps. These metrics were useful indicators of a 
counterparty’s strength. Because of the wide range of information available and cost, it 
went beyond the resources of the company to perform detailed ongoing analysis. 
 It was also identified that a risk-adjusted approach to setting counterparty limits is 
crucial for managing counterparty exposure and the risk of default. To optimize liquidity, it 
is in the company’s best interest to place higher balances in institutions with the lowest risk 
of default. Grouping banks into tiers and assigning a percentage of total balance to each tier 
allows for financial institutions to have a specific limit capacity. Incorporating these tools 
on a frequent basis allows for real-time analysis of counterparty exposure and risk.  
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 
The Company’s Treasury department has a fiduciary responsibility to safeguard the 
assets of the company through its Investment Guidelines Policy.  The purpose of an 
investment guideline policy is to provide The Company with an approved framework for 
managing its investment and cash program. This policy ultimately provides the direction 
and an accountability structure for the Treasury department in the execution and 
management of cash and investment transactions.  This includes investing available cash to 
ensure safety and liquidity and to provide the best return within a reasonable level of risk. 
The Company’s cash and investment position is important to the company’s future, the 
shareholders, and other business relationships.  
The objective of this thesis is to determine the optimal framework of measuring 
institutional risk and country risk that minimizes liquidity and operational risk to The 
Company while still meeting business growth needs.  The majority of the guidelines that 
are currently in place were put into effect quite some time ago when The Company and the 
financial markets were different than today. While The Company has made some 
modifications and allowed officer actions to change the guidelines since then, it is time to 
re-evaluate the current guidelines to ensure that adequate capacity is provided on a long-
term basis to meet worldwide growth objectives without continuously requesting 
modifications and officer’s actions.  
When re-evaluating the current guidelines, the following principles should be 
considered: 
 preserves principal, 
 meets liquidity needs, 
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 delivers the best yields possible within the guidelines of this policy and market 
conditions, 
 avoids inappropriate concentrations of investments, and 
 provides fiduciary control of all investments and cash. 
 
When investing, it is not possible to optimize all of these objectives at the same 
time. The achievement of one may mean that another objective may not be met. Therefore, 
The Company’s Treasury established that the first two objectives listed above are the most 
important to prioritize. One way to preserve principal and ensure liquidity within the 
financial institutions funds is placed is to measure each bank’s counterparty risk.  
As large corporations, such as The Company, continue to grow their business, an 
understanding of how the world’s economies and markets are becoming more interrelated 
leading to the expansion of investment internationally is crucial. The greater the potential 
for default, the higher the level of credit risk. Depending on the nature of the failure, this 
could result in a loss of principal, liquidity or return on the investment itself. The Company 
also has counterparty exposure to a particular bank through investment such as deposits, 
short-term securities, and bonds. All of these activities need to be accounted for across all 
of The Company’s business and subsidiaries to ascertain the full extent of counterparty 
exposure.  New models, methodologies, and approaches to counterparty and credit risk are 
evaluated in the thesis.  
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CHAPTER II: LITERATURE REVIEW 
The objective of the thesis is to develop a strategic investment strategy for 
managing global cash, short-term investment decisions, and the associated risks. There are 
a number of risk factors that may influence the overall policy, such as counterparty risk, 
liquidity risk, market risk, and country risk. 
 
2.1 Counterparty Risk 
According to a report published by JPMorgan in 2010 (Hughes), credit and 
counterparty risk arises when there is a transaction between an investor and some form of 
payment obligation from another party, in this case a financial institution. There is inherent 
risk that the bank will not be able to meet its repayment obligation or ultimately default. 
The greater the potential for default, the higher the level of counterparty and credit risk for 
that individual bank.  
Counterparty risk refers to the cash investment strategy of deposit accounts, which 
include bankers’ acceptances, demand deposit accounts (DDA), cash time deposits, non-
U.S repurchase agreements, Eurodollar time deposits, or certificates of deposit of local 
institutions.  
It is common among corporate treasury groups to feel concern about their 
companies’ exposure to financial counterparties due to the near collapse of the banking 
system in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Europe as a result of the 2008 credit 
crisis. It is interesting to note that the total global defaults on debt were $8 billion in 2007, 
and increased to $430 billion in 2008 (Biers, et. al, 2010). 
According to the Association for Financial Professionals (AFP) (2013), there are 
two elements in managing counterparty risk. The first is to avoid concentrating funds with 
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too few counterparties by limiting the amount of investment with any single counterparty. 
The second is to understand the relative strength of counterparties through financial market 
indicators such as credit ratings. In addition, AFP advises that many companies use 
published credit ratings in their investment policies, but should also look at other metrics 
beyond the credit rating itself. 
 
2.1.1 Credit Rating 
Credit ratings are enormously valuable and important in assessing the credit 
worthiness of a financial institution and its ability to pay its financial obligations. 
According to the Office of Investor Education and Advocacy  (U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission 2013), the ability to pay financial obligations is referred to as 
“creditworthiness”. Credit ratings are expressed on a scale of alpha symbols that are 
defined by the particular credit rating agency issuing those ratings. Table 2.1 shows a list of 
credit ratings.  The top rating of ‘AAA’ from S&P is the highest score indicating low 
likelihood of default.  A poor credit rating, such as a ‘C’ indicates a credit rating agency's 
opinion that the institution has a high risk of defaulting based on the historical and 
economic analysis completed by the rating agency.  
According to the policies and guidelines issued by the Nationally Recognized 
Statistical Rating Organizations (NRSROs) (SEC 2013), credit ratings are generally 
intended to indicate the relative degree of credit risk of a financial institution rather than 
reflect a measure of specific default probability or loss expectation. NRSROs generally use 
qualitative as well as quantitative analysis to derive their credit ratings. The quantitative 
analysis focuses on financial indicators such as profitability, margins, cash flows, resilience 
to market volatility, and market position. The qualitative analysis takes into consideration 
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such items as industry characteristics, country risk, leverage and financial policies, and 
corporate management.  Many panel participants at a public hearing held in November 
2002 favored the regulatory use of credit ratings issued by NRSROs as a simple, efficient 
benchmark of credit quality. 
The three most prominent NRSRO credit rating agencies are Moody’s Investors 
Services Inc. (Moody’s), Standard and Poor’s Inc. (S&P), and Fitch Inc. (Fitch).  A credit 
rating is considered investment grade if it is BBB- or higher, using the Fitch or S&P credit 
rating. Anything rated BB+ and below is considered to be speculative grade or otherwise 
“junk” investments.  Table 2.1 shows the three credit rating agencies descriptions of 
ratings, whereas the thick black line is the distinction between speculative (junk) and 
investment grade credit ratings.  
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Table 2.1: Long-term credit ratings from Moody’s, S&P, and Fitch  
Moody's S&P Fitch
Aaa AAA AAA
Aa1 AA+ AA+
Aa2 AA AA
Aa3 AA- AA-
A1 A+ A+
A2 A A
A3 A- A-
Baa1 BBB+ BBB+
Baa2 BBB BBB
Baa3 BBB- BBB-
Ba1 BB+ BB+
Ba2 BB BB
Ba3 BB- BB-
B1 B+ B+
B2 B B
B3 B- B-
Caa1 CCC+ CCC+
Caa2 CCC CCC
Caa3 CCC- CCC-
Ca CC CC
C C C
NR NR NR Not Rated
Description
Prime
High Grade
Upper Medium Grade
Lower Medium Grade
Non-Investment Grade Speculative
Highly Speculative
Substantial Risks
Extremely Speculative
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The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) published a statement on their 
website advising there is a great amount of evidence that credit ratings can be a lagging 
indicator since they do not address other risks such as liquidity risk, interest rate risk, 
market risk or prepayment risk (2013).  Yet despite the recent criticism, credit ratings 
remain the most popular method used to measure corporate credit quality.  Hilscher and 
Wilson (2013) found that ratings are poor predictors of corporate failure.  In addition, the 
report suggested that it is not possible for one measure to capture all the relevant financial 
information and may be prone to misinterpretation.  
 
2.1.2 Credit Default Swap 
Accurately defining and quantifying overall counterparty risk can be challenging; 
however using real-time information may offer valuable insight. Pu, Wu, and Wang (2011) 
investigate the role of credit default swaps (CDS) as an insurance contract against the 
default of debt instruments.  The sensitivity of CDS spreads to liquidity and counterparty 
risk is higher when default risk increases.   CDS prices are considered to be an excellent 
indicator of the markets’ perception of a firm’s default risk, and can create a balanced view 
of forward looking market risk metrics.  
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2.2 Liquidity Risk 
Liquidity risk is the risk that an investor cannot access funds when they are needed, 
which does not allow the investor to meet cash flow commitments. The AFP (2013) found 
that any loss of liquidity is likely to affect the net return on any investment and should be 
managed by having an effective cash position forecasting system in place. The AFP also 
found that the investment policy should restrict the use of investment instruments of longer 
maturities to manage liquidity risk.  
 
2.3 Market Risk 
Studies such as Carey and Stulz (2005) indicate that market risks are generally 
defined to be risks associated with fluctuations in prices of financial instruments. As 
companies gain more exposure to the market with short-term investments, they are likely to 
be exposed to interest rate and foreign exchange risk. The argument that market 
participants choose to address changes in the markets by developing formalized, 
quantitative risk measurement and management technologies is made by Cary and Stulz.   
 
2.4 Country Risk 
Country risk refers to the political, business, and economic risks that are specific to 
a country. With the promise of growth, emerging markets have caught the attention of 
many companies looking to grow their business internationally. Bloomberg (2013) argues 
that by understanding the interaction between a country’s government, economy, and the 
financial markets, a firm is able to better identify the overall strengths and weaknesses of a 
particular country. 
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It is crucial to determine and define the factors that may influence the overall 
investment policy such as counterparty risk, liquidity risk, market risk, and country risk.  
These arise whenever a treasury makes a decision and executes a policy or procedure that 
could result in losses of principal, liquidity, and potential return.  Historical analysis and 
benchmarking are key gauges for how to proceed with future cash placements and 
investment decisions.  Defining these risks leads to the development of a strategic 
investment process and implementation plan that can support treasury in making the right 
decisions.  
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CHAPTER III: THEORY AND METHODS 
 
It is hypothesized that by creating institution and country models to score market 
indicators, The Company will be able to achieve the main objective. The creation of new 
risk models and methodologies would ensure The Company is providing adequate 
investment capacity on a long-term basis to meet worldwide growth goals and reduce 
counterparty risk, exceptions and violations. 
3.1 Solution Development 
Using the ERIC model, Figure 3.1, there are many opportunities for enhancement 
and for value creation. By asking these questions, it opens the door for unlocking new ideas 
on how to manage daily investments and cash positions. The end results do not require The 
Company to “compete” with other businesses in their investment resolutions. It drives the 
company to scrutinize every factor within the investment banking world to help discover 
the range of implicit assumptions that are unconsciously made in the decision making 
process.  
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Figure 3.1 ERIC Model, action framework for investment guideline changes 
 
 
3.2 Eliminate 
Through the elimination of the old guidelines, it creates more possibilities for the 
creation of a new investment resolution policy. Different viewpoints were analyzed, 
including those of bank representatives, peer reviews, and discussions with managers 
within the department who have seen the benefits and disadvantages of the current 
guidelines. 
Through this process, The Company would eliminate the use of a single risk metric.  
Counterparty risk can be measured across three categories: market risk outlook, capital and 
assets resiliency, and growth and profitability. The goal is to create a balanced view of 
forward looking market risk metrics to ensure that The Company measures multiple levels 
of risk. Metrics considered are one or five year bank CDS levels, stock price, debt to asset 
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ratios, Moody’s long-term deposit rating, and efficiency ratios, etc.  Choosing the right 
measures and weighting of metrics is a very critical step in this process.  
Using one metric, the credit rating, doesn’t allow The Company to have a full 
measure of bank counterparty risk. By adding more metrics, it creates additional effort and 
analysis for the individual completing this task. The Company doesn’t have additional 
resources to add more employees to work on the compilation of metrics on an on-going 
basis. A solution would be to select metrics that are easily accessible, even if they aren’t the 
best market risk indicators. In the past, this is why credit-ratings were used.  Given access 
to programs through Bloomberg, there are ways to obtain data to complete thorough bank 
analysis.  This will most likely be the route that The Company takes for collecting data.  
The final item eliminated is the use of consolidated institution limits which limits 
are given to banks that have multiple accounts throughout the world. Since The Company 
does not have one central treasury system accounting for all cash and investments, it is 
difficult to manage different limits within one bank throughout the world. To eliminate 
these consolidated limits, The Company would have only one bank limit to follow. The 
difficulty is to ensure that each country knows what their portion of the total limit is and the 
communication of these limits. The Company would need to have all international funding 
group managers discuss limits that each country needs with “shared” banks such as Citi, 
JPMorgan, and U.S. Bank. Once these are set, The Company would distribute the amounts 
to individual units in the various countries.  
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3.3 Reduce  
There are low-value factors in the current investment guidelines that should be 
reduced such as the amount of exceptions there are to the current guidelines, violations that 
occur, and the amount of counterparty risk. Since the current guidelines do not evaluate 
how The Company is growing as a business and that has an effect on its cash balances, 
there are many exceptions. Since exceptions are approved by the CFO of The Company, 
exceptions that are really viewed as unnecessary are not considered.  
Although exceptions for amounts that are important should be made, some 
exceptions need to be made for Brazilian banks. These banks are generally risky, and 
would likely not qualify for higher limits due to their risk. Since The Company is growing 
business in Brazil, Russia, India, and China, there is a need for cash balances to expand. If 
exceptions for banks are not made, adequate growth capacity will not be available.  
Under the current guidelines there are multiple violations within the banking group 
The Company places cash within. These are reported to the Treasurer, CFO, and CEO 
based on the guidelines that do not allow for the capacity for the growing business. 
Because exceptions for higher limits were not requested, violations occur. This means more 
cash at banks in excess of their limit ultimately putting The Company at more risk than 
desired. If a bank were to go bankrupt, The Company could potentially lose the cash held at 
that bank creating liquidity issues. 
Another part of the overhaul of the investment guidelines is to reduce the chance of 
placing money in a bank that has a higher potential of default. The Company’s current 
guidelines may not be capturing all of the inherent risk that occurs in the banking industry.   
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3.4 Create 
An important opportunity is the creation of non-existent desirables such as new risk 
models and methodologies, and the new guidelines. The Company has never had a risk 
model for banking institutions that measures counterparty risk.  For over 20 years, The 
Company’s treasury department has used the same investment guidelines, with only minor 
updates and changes. They do not fit the current business needs The Company has for its 
daily cash balances. Creating a risk model also would quantify the metrics and allow for 
analysis to be based on market indicators. Accurately defining and quantifying overall 
counterparty risk is challenging using real time information but may offer valuable insight. 
There are potential disadvantages to creating a new model such as the man-power 
to create it and tools available to the Treasury department. Also, the issue of selecting 
correct metrics to the model is important.   
Another benefit of the new guidelines is a published accounting bulletin made 
available to all units with the investment policies and the specific limit that each can invest 
with particular banks. These would be published and be made available on a timely basis. 
This would lead to increased understanding of the cash investment options.  To publish an 
accounting bulletin at The Company will take some time because it goes through a rigorous 
review process and must be approved by different groups. The process may be slow and 
tedious, but in the end it will prove to be beneficial to the implantation of the new 
guidelines.  
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3.5 Increase 
Current guidelines only use one risk measurement in place and the methodology is 
confusing to those who interpret the guidelines. The goal with the creation of a new 
investment policy is to increase the user understanding and interpretation of the guidelines 
so that they understand how to invest and handle The Company’s cash balances. The 
Company is currently doing a satisfactory job of handling investments of cash, but it could 
improve. Various items could be increased such as: awareness of counterparty risk, 
increased frequency of bank reviews, and increased clarification of procedures.  
The Company’s treasury group understands counterparty risk, but not at a deep 
level. The Company must also ensure that they know their full exposure to any particular 
counterparty. There may be indirect counterparty exposure to the same bank if The 
Company invests cash in overnight time deposits, demand deposit accounts, and 
commercial paper all within that counterparty.  Therefore, the total counterparty exposure 
to the bank may be much greater than expected.   
There are many banks that are owned by a larger group of banks or part of a larger 
parent group. If Deutsche bank is partially owned by Citibank, then Deutsche would need 
to be included in Citibank’s exposure. The Company does not want to put itself in a riskier 
position by giving both banks owned by the same group the same limit. If both defaulted, 
this could result in large losses. Parent guarantees, especially as to what extent one bank 
owns the other, are hard to measure due to frequency of buyouts in the financial industry. 
Counterparty risk should be measured by full exposure to any particular counterparty, 
based on the parent company.   
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Definitions in the current guidelines are confusing to understand, and terminology 
in the investment community can be hard to follow. By broadening the definitions 
pertaining to the new investment guidelines, The Company would allow units to increase 
their understanding and interpretation of the guidelines. Clear and concise wording allows 
for better investment decisions.  
The frequency of reviews occurring will increase. Currently this occurs quarterly.  
Since more current metrics would be used, it would only make sense to review either 
weekly or daily bank information to guard against deteriorating credit quality of banks.  
Solutions for revising the old investment guidelines should consider Bloomberg 
data. Quantitative as opposed to qualitative measures would benefit The Company. In 
many complex processes such as the investment guidelines, the numbers can be analyzed.   
A particular strength of quantitative research is that statistical analysis allows for 
generalization. The results are based on numeric analysis and statistics.  Qualitative data 
does provide a depth and richness not possible with quantitative data, and could be used by 
upper management at The Company.  
This could ultimately create an environment that supports the ideas and 
methodologies required to implement a strategy for the new investment guidelines and 
ensure that The Company is providing adequate capacity on a long-term basis to meet the 
worldwide growth objectives without continuously requesting modifications and officer’s 
actions. It will take more than just one analyst to compile all of this data, to gather 
information, and develop a system to capture all inherent counterparty risk associated with 
The Company’s growing business.  
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CHAPTER IV: RESULTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
This chapter explains and reports the results of the models and whether or not 
changes should be recommended towards The Company’s current investment policy.  
Corporates must mitigate risk across multiple levels. To accurately define and quantify 
overall counterparty risk can be challenging, however using the right set of broad market 
metrics can improve counterparty evaluation. 
4.1 Probability of Default Theory 
Predicting risk and the probability that a financial institution will default is the basis 
behind the probability of default theory.  Probability of default is a quantitative assessment 
of the likelihood that the obligor, in this case the financial institution that The Company 
places deposits, will default within a specified period of time.  Probability of default can be 
estimated and assigned either to a single client or to a portfolio of clients with similar 
characteristics.   
The Basel Accords are a set of agreements that provide recommendations on 
capital, market, and operational risk to guarantee banks have enough capital to not default 
on obligations. Banks need to estimate a probability of default for each of their obligors. 
The Company is essentially doing this for their banking group.   
Default models are used to support or supplant credit analysis and to calculate 
counterparty limits. The most valuable tool to measure credit risk is the financial 
institution’s credit rating score. Ratings are expected to differentiate stronger firms from 
weaker ones, which will assign high ratings to those that are less likely to default on their 
credit obligations.   
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The Average Cumulative Issuer-Weighted Global Default Rates by Alphanumeric 
Rating, 1998-2011 was used as the basis for The Company’s probability of default model 
(Moody’s). Table 4.1 shows issuer-weighted historical average default rates by rating 
category over various investment horizons.  The rating categories are categorized by the 
number of years the investment horizon spans.  The longer the investment spans, the higher 
the risk of default.  The data were determined by averaging the multi-year default rates of 
cohorts in the financial industry.  These are statements of historical fact that have been 
found to be useful benchmarks for the expected likelihood of default for obligations.  In 
this study, Moody’s connects the historical performance of Moody’s ratings as predictors 
of default and loss severity for corporate issuers. This is a valuable tool to measure default 
patterns, and allows for The Company to quantify groups of credit risks together. For 
example the global default rate for an A2 rating for six years is 1.364%. 
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Table 4.1 The Average Cumulative Issuer-Weighted Global Default Rates by 
Alphanumeric Rating, 1998-2011  
 
Source: Moody’s 
 
 
For the purpose of this study, a Tier Limit Model was created based on Moody’s 
Probability of Default study. The study compiled 13 years of data measuring the historical 
performance of Moody’s ratings as predictors of default and loss severity for corporate 
issuers. This model uses the one year probability of default percentages, because The 
Company’s cash and investments are relatively short term and do not extend over 12 
months.  
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The tier cut-offs for the Tier Limit Model determining the cutoff Tier 1 and Tier 2 
are based off of Moody’s credit rating categories as in Figure 4.3 below. The following cut-
off methodology is used where credit ratings are applied: 
Tier 1: Aaa-A3 
Tier 2: Baa1-Baa3 
Tier 3: Ba1-Ba3 
Tier 4: B1-C and Non-rated banks.  
All banks and countries are divided into four tiers, with 1 being the least risky and 4 
being high risk with a higher likelihood to default. The base limit is the highest amount that 
The Company deems safe to invest with any one counterparty. This makes up the Tier 1 
limit for the Tier Limit Model. A base limit calculation is projected for each fiscal year is 
the total of The Company assets by 0.5%. Tier 1 is the maximum amount The Company is 
willing to put with any one institution. An example is if The Company’s forecasted total 
assets are $50 billion; multiply that by 0.5% will equate to $250 million. A convention of 
rounding up or down to the nearest $5,000,000 is applied to the calculated dollar amounts.   
It was critical that the Company’s new investment guidelines allow for the 
company’s growing business structure. The previous guidelines did not have sufficient 
capacity and had hard dollar amounts set with no methodology to support the limits for 
each counterparty.  By setting a base limit to the Tier Limit Model, this allows for the 
limits within the guidelines to grow with the business.  
Tiers 2 and 3 are calculated by taking the averages of the probability of default 
percentage from Limit 1 to Limit 2 multiplied by the Limit 1 dollar amount.  Figure 4.3 
shows this in more detail. By multiplying the base limit of $250 million by the Tier 2 
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average of 0.25%, the Tier 2 limit equates to $65 million. The same methodology in Figure 
4.3 is used to calculate Tier 3, where 0.75% is multiplied by the Tier 2 limit of $65 million 
to get a Tier 3 limit of $20 million. This approach does not apply to the 4th tier, as it would 
calculate an impractical tier limit. Therefore, the 4th tier assumes double the risk of the 3rd 
tier, adhering to the previously mentioned rounding convention.  
Figure 4.2 The Company’s Total Assets, Total Equity, and Market Capitalization 
comparison from October 2002 – October 2012.  
 
 
For the base limit calculation, the model needed to have a metric that allows 
flexibility as the company grows. Metrics analyzed were The Company’s total assets, total 
equity, and total market capitalization. Many discussions throughout the Treasury 
department, bank advisors, and peers revolved around maximum amount corporates should 
be willing to lose in total at any counterparty.  The discussion resulted in 1% of market 
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capitalization, which would roughly be $250 - $300 million.  After reviewing historic 
market capital, it was clear that it is not a steady growth metric. Instead the thought process 
was to think in terms of equity, and transfer into assets, backing into the 0.5% calculation. 
Figure 4.2 shows the volatility in market capitalization, equity, and total assets over time. 
The Tier Limit Model is applied to both the Institution Tier Model and Country 
Tier Model. For example, a Tier 1 bank would be given a maximum limit of $250 million 
and a Tier 1 country would also be given a maximum limit of $250 million.  This allows 
for one consistent policy with amounts allowed to invest within each Tier. Figure 4.3 
shows this in more detail.  
 
The permitted investment level for each risk tier is determined as follows:  
o Tier 1: Base Limit  
o Tier 2: Division between averages Probability of Default Percentage from 
Limit 1 to Limit 2 multiplied by the Limit 1 dollar amount. 
o Tier 3: Division in average Probability of Default Percentage from Limit 2 
to Limit 3 multiplied by the Limit 2 dollar amount.    
o Tier 4: 50% of Limit 3 dollar amount.  
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Figure 4.3 Tier Limit Model 
 
 
4.2 Counterparty Risk   
Counterparty risk is the risk that an entity with which an investment instrument is 
held fails to meet its obligations as promised. The greater the potential for default, the 
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higher the level of credit risk. Depending on the nature of the failure, this could result in a 
loss of interest, and/or principal. The Company also has counterparty exposure to a 
particular bank through investments such as deposits, short-term securities, and bonds. All 
of these activities need to be accounted for across all of The Company’s business and 
subsidiaries to ascertain the full extent of counterparty exposure. The Company’s main 
concern is to preserve principal by avoiding potential negative credit migration. 
4.3 Credit Risk Theory 
The safety of most financial institutions can be judged from bond ratings provided 
by a credit rating agency such as Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s (S&P), and Fitch. Figure 4.4 
lists the possible bond ratings a financial institution can receive by declining order of 
quality. The highest rating, which would be Aaa or AAA, indicates that the financial 
institution has a very low credit risk profile. A rating of Ba or worse would be referred to as 
speculative grade, and are of higher credit risk and potential of default. For evaluating 
financial institution’s risk level, the higher the credit rating, the higher the limit of deposits 
The Company could place at that individual financial institution.  
Figure 4.5 shows the long term debt credit rating of Moody’s, S&P, and Fitch’s 
credit rating comparisons with descriptions and The Company’s tier cutoff points. This 
accounts for the first of two metrics in the Institution Tier Model. The lowest grade given 
by any one of the three credit rating agencies is used in the model, which allows for a more 
conservative credit review. This metric accounts for half of the total Institution Tier score.  
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Figure 4.4 Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s, and Fitch Credit Ratings 
 
Source: (Brealey, Myers and Allen 2011) 
 
Further credit rating definitions and descriptions are listed at the end of this thesis in the 
Appendix A, the bond credit rating descriptions.   
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Figure 4.5 Moody’s, S&P, and Fitch’s credit rating descriptions with the associated 
Tier cutoff points for the credit rating score.  
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4.4 Diversification  
Diversification among a group of financial institutions decreases risk of default and 
a substantial reduction in variability in deposits and investments.  By spreading out where 
cash is held, corporates have a smaller likelihood of losing all of their funds if there are 
problems in the market or economy.  This would assume a risk-adjusted approach to 
investing that places cash balances at banks not based solely on yield.  
 
4.5 Country Risk  
Country risk, refers to the interaction between a country’s government, economy 
and the financial markets, is key to identifying the strength and weakness a country’s risk 
level. Emerging markets have caught attention of investors around the world with the 
increased opportunities for investments and developing economies. Companies looking to 
invest internationally look at political risk as one factor among a number of metrics that can 
help evaluate country risk. Political risk is the risk or threat that a government will change 
or break a promise after the investment of cash has already been made. This would also 
include corruption, regulatory and other business risks.   
The global financial crisis highlighted the different financial and business risks 
associated with doing business abroad. In some circumstances, there will have to be 
exceptions to country risk to continue to grow business internationally. There are 
significant geographies, or growth countries that need higher balances than what its 
calculated risk level would advise. Also, some countries are highly regulated, causing 
“trapped” cash balances that are not accessible. 
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  The Company will most likely have business needs that supersede the country risk 
such as with Brazilian banks. These banks are generally risky and most likely would not 
qualify for higher limits due to their high risk. Since The Company is growing business in 
countries such as Brazil, Russia, India, and China, there is a need for high cash balances to 
grow the business and therefore keep cash within the country. If The Company does not 
allow exceptions for banks then growth would be constrained.  
These risk theories are the first line of defense in managing potential credit or 
counterparty risk. Processes should be in place so that bank exposure can be properly 
monitored and reported on an ongoing basis. This will ensure that exposures can be known 
at any time across all parts of the business and allow for The Company to better maintain 
any risk of default by its banking group.  
The following Country Tier Model assigns each country a risk tier rating of one 
through four, with one being the least risky country. The following equation is used for this 
model: 
50% Composite Country Score plus 50% Bloomberg Risk Score = Country Limit 
 
Using a 50% weighting of a composite country score and a 50% Bloomberg risk 
score, the model can be used to determine what that individual country’s limit should be.  
The first metric, the composite country score, is the lowest rating assigned to a given 
country by any of the three rating agencies. This metric is an evaluation of the credit 
worthiness of the country, and their likelihood of default. It also indicates the risk level of 
the investing environment of a country associated also with political risk.  
The Bloomberg risk score, the second metric to the Country Tier Model, ranks 
countries on a scale of 1-100 on 32 individual metrics including:  
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 Financial Risk: 5Y CDS, 10Y Bond Spread, 1Y Price Change (%), Index 
Returns to Global Ave (Z-Score), Index PE Ratio, EIU Banking Risk, FX 
Forecast, Historical 3M Volatility, FX Volume – 3M Implied Volume, Real 
Rates, Real Effective Exchange Rate 
 Economic Risk: GDP YOY%, GDP Forecast, GDP Value (BLN USD), 
Currency Reserves (BLN USD), Reserves 1Y Chg (%), Short Term 
External Debt (%GDP), Total External Debt (BLN USD), CPI Actual, CPI 
Forecast, Current Account (% of GDP), Imports (BLN USD), Exports 
(BLN USD), Unemployment, Unemployment (Forecast).  
 Political Risk: EIU Political Risk, Alliant Pol & Eco Rating, Expropriation 
Risk, Currency Inconvertibility, Trade Credit Risk, Ease of Doing Business 
Rank, Starting a Business Rank.  
 
In assigning a risk tier to a country without a Bloomberg Risk Score, the following 
defines the tier cut off points: 
 Tier 1: 100-64.01 
 Tier 2: 64-55.01 
 Tier 3: 55-40.01 
 Tier 4: 40-0 
Countries with a credit rating equal to or higher than AA-, as rated by S&P, or the 
equivalent rating assigned by any other rating agency, will be evaluated based on their 
credit rating. Countries with a credit rating equal to or lower than A+ as rated by S&P, or 
the equivalent rating assigned by any other rating agency will be evaluated based on the 
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above calculation in which the country’s Bloomberg Risk Score will default to that of a 
Tier 4 country. 
  Figure 4.6 is an example of the Country Tier Model after both metrics are 
combined.  The Total Weighted Average column represents the final tier for each 
individual country. This model is reviewed on an annual basis, at which time exceptions to 
the model can be presented to the Treasurer and CFO to approve.  
 
Figure 4.6 Country Tier Model Example  
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The tier to which a country is assigned determines the maximum amount of total 
deposit accounts that may be placed in that country by all The Company entities, combined 
parent and subsidiaries. Deposits include the following: bankers’ acceptances, demand 
deposit accounts (DDA), cash time deposits, non-U.S repurchase agreements, Eurodollar 
time deposits, or certificates of deposit of local institutions. The total country limit will be 
measured based on the country where the account is held and not where the The Company 
account holder is located. 
The total of all deposit accounts at any given financial institution in a given country 
may not exceed the country limit for that country. An example of how the institutions 
within a country are still limited by the country limit is presented in Figure 4.7. Germany is 
a Tier 1 country, with a country limit of $250 million, which cannot be superseded by the 
total of all the institution limits of $890 million. The units within Germany would have a 
responsibility to manage their limits at these banks to stay within the model limit of $250 
million. If the cash held at these German banks were to go in excess of $250 million, this 
would be considered a violation and would need to be reported on a quarterly basis to the 
CFO and Treasurer. 
 
Figure 4.7 Total list of banks in Germany with their tier level and total instition limit 
amount 
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4.6 Institution Tier Model 
The institution limit is determinedusing an institution risk tier model that is 
reviewed on a weekly basis or more frequently as needed. There are two metrics to this 
model; the long term credit rating score and five year credit default swap score (CDS). 
Figure 4.5 shows the breakdown of the first metric, the long term credit rating.  
If an institution does not have a credit rating, it will be given a value of no rating 
(NR), which falls into the 4th tier of riskiness. Given that there is not enough data for a 
credit rating agency to assign a credit score, The Company will not assume a higher value 
for a NR bank. 
The second metric in the Institution Tier Model is the five year CDS score.  A 
credit default swap is essentially an insurance policy issued by banks, that would be the 
sellers, and taken out by investors or otherwise known as the buyers. They help protect 
against failure among their investors. The higher the CDS value, the higher the likelihood 
of default.  Almost all of the larger banks The Company uses actively trade 5-year CDS. 
There are a few such as Toronto Dominion, Northern Trust, and Fifth Third that do not. In 
total, roughly 50 of The Company’s 150 banks have a 5-year CDS. If a bank does not have 
a 5-year CDS, the bank will then default to using only the first metric, the long term credit 
rating metric score.  
Since rating agencies can fail to identify all inherit risks, a second metric was 
required for the Institution Tier Model to be complete. A study done by Capital IQ (Figure 
4.8) shows that the S&P short term credit rating is not very correlated to the financial 
institution’s one-year CDS rating. The coefficient of determination, or the R2, between 
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agency ratings and CDS spreads is 54%. The R2 value explains the strength between credit 
ratings and CDS spreads.  Many other corporates have increased the use of CDS spreads 
since the 2008 credit crisis.  
 
 
Figure 4.8 Capital IQ study showing S&P Short Term credit ratings compared to 1-
year CDS 
        
 The first choice for CDS was the one year (1Y) CDS, but due to the illiquidity of 
the 1Y CDS market, The Company chose to go with the five year (5Y) CDS. Since The 
Company wanted to incorporate a metric that was readily available on the majority of its 
banks, the five-year CDS was best. Of the 150 banks, roughly 20 only had a one-year CDS 
whereas almost 50 had the five-year.  An analysis of data on the 1Y CDS and 5Y CDS 
levels, found that the correlation between the two was 85%.  This shows that there is a 
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fairly strong relationship between the 1Y and 5Y CDS metrics. Figure 4.9 shows this in 
more detail, along with appendix B. 
 
Figure 4.9 One year and five year CDS correlation comparisons for large financial 
institutions  
 
 
Reval, an online treasury and risk management information site, publishes an index 
that takes an average of all the institutions within a credit rating level’s 5-year CDS spread. 
This index is then used to determine cut-off points for the CDS tier score. Figure 4.10, the 
Reval index composite of A rated banks was 103.1 on that particular day. In the CDS tier 
scoring metric, anything that is a 103.1 and lower would score into Tier 1. The other cutoff 
points were set also similar to the credit rating cutoffs in Figure 4.5.  
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Figure 4.10 CDS score tier breakdown with information from REVAL 
 
 
The Reval index is updated on a daily basis and moves with the markets. The Reval 
index should highlight issues with individual institutions that are out of line with general 
market trends. In addition, this will allow The Company to monitor general market shifts. 
Figure 4.11 illustrates when CDS levels started to rise due to negative economic data in the 
United States, turmoil in emerging markets, and data showing American factories 
expanding at the weakest pace since June 2013. This also came when Treasury Secretary 
Jack Lew warned that the United States could potentially run into debt ceiling and default 
issues.   
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Figure 4.11 5Y CDS levels January 13, 2014 – February 3, 2014  
 
 
Figure 4.12 shows how the following formula for all institutions are divided into 
four risk tiers based on the following formula: 
  
50% Composite Institution Long Term Debt Rating Score plus 50% 5-year CDS 
Score = Institution Limit 
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Figure 4.12 Institution Tier Model 
 
 
The Institution Limits apply to all deposit accounts that include the following: 
bankers’ acceptances, demand deposit accounts (DDA), cash time deposits, non-U.S 
repurchase agreements, Eurodollar time deposits, or certificates of deposit of local 
institutions. The total of all deposit accounts at all worldwide locations of any institution 
may not exceed the institution limit assigned by the Institution Tier Model. In addition, 
institution limits do not apply to investments in money market funds, commercial paper, 
U.S. securities, and international money market funds.  
The tier to which an institution is assigned determines the maximum amount of 
deposits that may be placed in that institution by all The Company entities on a global 
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basis, combined parent and subsidiaries. For example, if you look at Figure 4.12, the China 
Everbright Bank Co-A scores out as a Tier 2 bank on the Institution Tier Model.  The limit 
for a Tier 2 bank, as per Figure 4.3 is $65 million. This then means that the China 
Everbright bank has a maximum limit of $65 million.  
 
4.7 Recommendations 
Currently The Company does not have one central Treasury system to account for 
all the cash held throughout all worldwide entities. Financials are collected at the end of 
each quarter when individual units send in their Q-8’s to Treasury, but intra-quarter there is 
no process to measure the cash held at each institution. For larger banks that have multiple 
accounts around the world, such as Citi Bank N.A., this could create violations to the 
current guidelines because it does not separate out individual units from other countries 
with the specific limits. An example would be if Citi Bank has different institution limits, 
with one total global limit that Citi Bank cannot exceed. All of these smaller consolidated 
institution limits could exceed the global limit. Obviously, this creates various violations of 
the policy for Citi Bank for any given quarter.    
The current guidelines only evaluate counterparty risk associated within each bank 
based on its credit rating score from Moody’s, Fitch, or Standard and Poor’s. These rating 
agencies provide credit ratings for short and long term debt securities. Rating agencies may 
not identify all inherit risk, and shouldn’t be relied upon fully for evaluating counterparty 
risk since they are considered by some a “lagging indicator”, primarily based on data that is 
already in the market (Association for Financial Professionals, 2013).  It would be best to 
have the new guidelines that are more forward looking and include more metrics than just 
credit ratings. This is an important topic, because The Company’s number one priority is to 
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preserve principal and ensure The Company’s liquidity position is protected. To 
accomplish this, risk measurements must be adequate.  
 
4.8 Investments Results 
The investment portion of the guidelines and the suggested changes primarily 
involve government security investments, repurchase agreements, money market mutual 
funds, international money market funds, and commercial paper. These data were collected 
through a peer review study completed through conversations with multiple investment 
banks.   
Securities that are direct obligations of the U.S. Government are generally 
considered very low risk. In most cases, it can be assumed that sovereign institutions such 
as the United States will honor their debt obligations.  Examples of federally guaranteed 
obligations The Company is allowed to invest in include Treasury Notes, Treasury bills, 
and Treasury backed prime money market funds. Since the U.S. is considered 
economically stable and the debt is considered guaranteed by the full faith and credit of the 
United States government, The Company will allow an unlimited global capacity in these 
investments.  
Repurchase agreements sold by institutions that at the time of the trade are on the 
list of approved primary U.S. government securities dealers of the Federal Reserve, as 
published from time to time. Collateral Issuer Limits must qualify for investment under 
Institutional Limits and are allowed by The Company to have a global limit of $250 million 
and an individual broker limit of $100 million. Both limits were determined after peer 
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analysis review as close to an industry standard and historical analysis of repurchase 
agreements use.   
Prime money market mutual funds that meet the following guidelines: eligible 
under U.S. Investment Company Act Rule 2(a)(7), and must be AAA/AAAm rated. Rule 
2(a)(7) includes restrictions around credit quality, maturity and liquidity as well as rules 
around ongoing operations and transparency to investors. Money market funds have a 
global limit of 5% of the funds’ Assets Under Management (AUM), that must be applied 
for each individual fund. The 5% AUM was determined after a peer analysis of other 
corporates investment percentages.  
International Money Market Funds that meet criteria similar to that of U.S. 
Investment Company Act Rule 2(a)(7) money market mutual funds and are rated 
AAA/AAAm. International money market funds have a global limit of 5% of the funds’ 
Assets Under Management (AUM), that must be applied for each individual fund. Certain 
international funds, such as Deutsche, have funds with multiple currencies. Each individual 
fund with separate currencies will be counted as their own fund since they have individual 
AUM’s.  
Commercial paper rated at least A-1, P-1, or F-1 respectively, by at least two rating 
agencies will be given a global limit of $250 million and individual issuer limit of $50 
million. These limits were determined based off of peer analysis and The Company’s 
maximum investment amount of $250 million as per the tier limit model. The Company 
also has the option to invest globally $150 million and by issuer of $25 in commercial 
paper rated at least A-1, P-1, or F-1 respectively, by at least one rating agency. These were 
also deemed as industry standard when compared to other companies and bank analysis.  
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4.9 Review Criteria 
Accurately defining and quantifying overall counterparty risk is challenging, but 
using real time information and reviewing it offers valuable insight. To ensure that The 
Company is capturing all market risks and the appropriate personnel are reviewing it, there 
will be multiple reviews put in place. Some need to occur more frequently than others, such 
as five-year CDS levels and credit ratings.  
4.9.1 Annual Review 
 The Company will review on an annual basis the metrics for the Tier Limit Model, 
which is the forecasted total assets multiplied by the 0.5% to come up with the base limit 
amount.  The base limit amount needs to be reviewed annually to keep with The 
Company’s growth ambitions and to allow for flexibility within the guidelines. Forecasted 
assets are established by The Company’s forecasting group at the beginning  
 The Country Tier Model will also be re-estimated at this time due to the 
Bloomberg Risk Score being updated on an annual basis. If the Bloomberg Risk Score 
were to be updated on a more frequent basis, it would be recommended to also increase the 
frequency of country reviews.  Any exceptions to the models will be approved by The 
Company’s CFO and Treasurer. Upon completion of the annual review, limits will be 
revised. An Accounting Bulletin will be distributed to all The Company units worldwide. 
This bulletin will be issued to provide visibility to the revised Investment Guidelines as 
well as to provide specific institution and country limits for the geographies in which units 
conduct business.  
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4.9.2 Quarterly Review 
Institution tiers will be reviewed and any quarterly violations will be brought to the 
attention of the Treasurer and CFO. Also on a quarterly basis other exceptions that need to 
be made due to changes in models or business needs will be made and signed off by the 
Treasurer. 
4.9.3 Weekly Review 
On a weekly basis, the finance analyst within the Treasury group will collect 
Bloomberg information. This includes five-year credit default swap (CDS) levels and credit 
ratings. The five-year CDS levels will also be updated through Reval to reflect current 
market data to benchmark CDS levels. Reval is global provider of treasury and risk 
management information. The Company uses Reval for foreign exchange trading and other 
various information, such as the benchmarking for financial CDS benchmarking.  The 
Institution Tier Model will then be calculated with the updated data and banks will be 
reviewed by upper management by the frequency and amounts they shifted in tiers.  
4.9.4 Weekly Review Criteria  
Weekly reviews will be completed using Figure 4.13 to distinguish when banks 
need to move tiers, which would indicate a need to update the master bulletin.  Since CDS 
levels can move more frequently because they show current market conditions, The 
Company’s models need to take this into account. At the same time, The Company does 
not want to have frequent movements in tiers due to inconsistent CDS levels. This would 
cause constant confusion to update the Accounting Bulletin with these changes in tiers, and 
units would be expected to constantly move cash around based on these changes.  
To capture frequent movements in CDS levels along with credit risk, while 
balancing significant market changes, Figure 4.13 advises when a bank will actually move 
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tier levels. During a weekly review, if a bank meets any one of the four criteria, it will be 
moved at that time. This leaves room for The Company to be as objective as possible, 
while still leaving room for subjective review. Any exceptions to the review criteria would 
need to be approved by an officer’s action by the CFO and Treasurer.  
Change in Credit Rating Tier: during the weekly review if a financial institution 
changes tiers based on an increase or decrease in credit ratings, which would include the 
lowest credit rating of the three credit rating agencies, immediate action will be taken. The 
bank will assume the lower tier limit.  
Shifting Two Tiers: during the weekly review if a financial institution changes two 
tiers immediate action will be taken. The bank will assume the lower tier limit. Changing 
two tiers would significantly increase the perceived risk that the bank will default.  
Shift One Tier: The Company will document the changes and monitor. No 
immediate change needed if the tier shift is based on CDS levels. CDS can be volatile 
based on market information, so in order to keep banks from moving constantly, The 
Company will not take action until the bank has been at the shifted tier four consecutive 
weeks. 
Four Weeks Consecutive Tier Movement: the bank will assume the lower or higher 
tier if on the fourth consecutive week it has remained at the changed tier. An example 
would be if Citi was originally a Tier 1 bank, and moves to Tier 2 due to changes in CDS in 
a weekly review. Citi would need to remain at Tier 2 level for another consecutive three 
weeks to actually move down to that tier and have Accounting Bulletin changes distributed.  
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Figure 4.13 Weekly Review Criteria for Institution Tier Model 
 
 
4.10 Implementation of the Models 
For the first fiscal quarter of 2014, The Company implemented the models and 
methodologies presented in this thesis. In total, there were eight different financial 
institutions that changed according to the criteria listed in Figure 4.13. The two main 
components of the Institution Tier Model are the 5Y CDS and long term credit rating. The 
5Y CDS levels were the main driver of any change to an institution’s tier level.  
Figure 4.14, 4.15, and 4.16 show three banks that had actual tier movement in Q1 
of 2014. Societe Generale and Dresdner Bank both had increases in late November 2013 
from Tier 2 to Tier 1 due to increases in CDS levels. Bayerische Landesbank had a 
decrease in January 2014 due to a decrease in CDS. This brought Bayerische from a Tier 1 
to a Tier 2.  The decline in CDS remained for four consecutive weeks at a different tier than 
what they were originally assigned.  
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Figure 4.14 Societe Generale Bank Tier level and 5Y CDS spread for fiscal Q1 2014.  
 
Figure 4.15 Dresdner Bank Tier level and 5Y CDS spread for fiscal Q1 2014.  
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Figure 4.16 Bayerische Landesbank Tier level and 5Y CDS spread for fiscal Q1 2014.  
 
 
By reviewing the data on a weekly basis and using integrated risk metrics allows 
for the investment policy to adapt to the changing financial environment. Looking at 
Figures 4.14-4.16, the final tier movements resulted in a time period of four consecutive 
weeks where the bank remained at the changed tier. This then resulted in a move to the new 
tier level. If there was no time period to review if this change was significant enough to 
adjust limits, banks that have volatile 5Y CDS spreads could be moving constantly. This 
would create confusion with entities and numerous bulletins being released with the new 
tier information. The Company wanted to avoid frequent alterations to the final tier model, 
or master bulletin.  
 The implementation of this process for banks was completed for the Institution Tier 
Model with only eight resulting in final tier movements that caused the master bulletin to 
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change. After a review of Q1 2014, it has been decided that no changes to the model is 
required and that the current metrics used to analyze counterparty risk are acceptable. 
Figure 4.17 shows an example of the weekly review process in which all 
movements are tracked based on the criteria in Figure 4.13. October 28th, 2013 was the first 
week of The Company’s fiscal Q1 2014. This week there were no banks on watch or 
review. On the following week, November 4th, 2013 two banks, Credit Agricole and 
Societe Generale increased from Tier 2 to Tier 1 based on an increase in their 5Y CDS 
spreads.  This signifies to the analyst that this is the first week these banks are on watch, 
and would need to remain at Tier 1 level for another consecutive three weeks to actually 
move up to a Tier 1.  
 Figure 4.17 Two weeks of weekly review history.  
 
 
Figure 4.18 shows in more detail how upper management is informed of any bank 
that is categorized as on watch, on a three-week warning, or needs to be reviewed due to 
meeting one of the four criteria to move to a different final tier.  The email alerts managers 
as to what the current tier the bank is scoring at, and how many weeks it has been either on 
watch or if it requires review.   
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By notifying managers of any changes permits time for discussion to take place on 
what needs to happen if limits are decreasing. This also allows for managers to know if 
they need to put together an exception to the policy from the CFO and Treasurer. This 
would be the case if multiple units use bank accounts with Citi, which is a Tier 1 bank with 
a limit of $250M.  If Citi is downgraded to Tier 2 status for four consecutive weeks and 
needs to change tiers, the new Tier 2 limit would be $65M. Managers would most likely 
need to request an exception to the policy because the $65M would not be a realistic limit 
for a large bank such as Citi that many units use for daily cash activity.  
Figure 4.18 Email distribution details on weekly criteria  
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CHAPTER V: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 
The objective of the thesis, as it is defined in Chapter 1 is to determine a framework 
of measuring institutional risk and country risk that minimizes liquidity and operational 
risk. The revision of The Company’s investment policy was to ensure that adequate 
investment capacity is provided on a long-term basis to meet the worldwide growth 
objectives of the business.  There are many critical factors influencing the outcome of the 
investment guidelines policy for The Company. These include: 
 Being able to manage global limits from a central Treasury location 
 Market metrics/indicators to evaluate risk 
 Quantitative analysis versus qualitative analysis 
 Objective analysis with room for subjective review 
 Limited employees, budgets and time constraints 
 Communication from central Treasury on policies and implementation of 
investments and cash placements to all of The Company’s units 
 Meeting liquidity needs while managing counterparty risk 
The models developed use market risk indicators assigned through numerical data 
to estimate counterparty risk of financial institutions and countries that The Company 
places cash within. There is no perfect way to predict if or when a financial institution will 
default on its obligations to investors, but through the models and methodologies 
developed, The Company can better predict when counterparty failure may be present.  
Enhancing the risk controls should remain an ongoing process. Companies should 
re-evaluate the application of corporate cash in response to market pressure. By revisiting 
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the investment policy, companies can ensure risk thresholds sufficiently reflect the current 
market environments and have the appropriate tolerance levels. These models allow The 
Company to develop an investment strategy for managing global cash and the associated 
financial risks. Treasurers, and those managing cash transactions and investments, need to 
have a clear understanding of the fundamental objectives of investment: maintaining 
principal, ensuring liquidity, and maximizing yield. Fundamentally all investment decisions 
are about managing the risk. 
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APPENDIX A: BOND RATING DEFINITIONS 
 
Source: Moody’s (2011). 
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APPENDIX B: ONE YEAR AND FIVE YEAR CREDIT DEFAULT SWAP 
COMPARISON FOR MAJOR FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS FROM 2007-2013 
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APPENDIX C: Q1 2014 WEEKLY REVIEWS RESULTS OF INSTITITION TIER 
CHANGES.  
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